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The early literature on time consistency, developed by Kydland and Prescott [19] , Calvo [8] , and others, compares environments which have technologies for a government to make binding future commitments with environments which have no such technologies. The main point of this work was to show that the policies chosen in an environment without commitment may be quite different from the Ramsey policies, those chosen in an environment with commitment. Recently, however, work by Barro and Gordon [5] , Stokey [25] , and Chari and Kehoe [10] , has shown that in environments without commitment, trigger-type mechanisms can often support the Ramsey policies. (For a discussion of trigger mechanisms, see Friedman [13] , Green and Porter [17] , and Fudenberg and Maskin [16] .)
A key feature of the models in the recent literature is that they are repeated versions of a one-period model. Technically, these models have no state variables like capital, debt, or money that link periods. Most models of interest in macroeconomics, however, have such state variables. This paper shows that the outcomes of such trigger mechanisms in dynamic environments may be fundamentally different from the outcomes of such mechanisms in repeated environments. We concentrate on a classic problem in the time consistency literature, namely, the incentive for a government to default on debt.
In an early contribution, Prescott [22] analyzed a simple infinite horizon economy in which the government finances a given stream of expenditures by raising distorting labor taxes and by selling debt. He found that if there is no technology for making binding future commitments, the government always defaults on outstanding debt to avoid levying distorting taxes. In the equilibrium of his model, the value of government debt is zero and the government runs a continuously balanced budget. This early work presents a challenge to economists interested in explaining why governments do not default on their inherited debt. An intuitive explanation is based on a trigger mechanism: governments fear that, if they default, private agents will be less willing to lend to them in the future. If the losses incurred by the government from future borrowing difficulties outweigh the current benefits from defaulting, the government will not default.
In this paper, we explore this intuitive explanation in a formal general equilibrium model. We consider the types of mechanisms which are used in repeated models by Barro and Gordon [5] , Stokey [25] , and Chari and Kehoe [10] , to support the Ramsey outcomes. These mechanisms specify infinite reversion to the limit of the finite horizon equilibrium. In our environment the analogous mechanisms specify infinite reversion to a (weak) Markov equilibrium. In this Markov equilibrium the government defaults on positive debt and accepts payments owed to it by consumers (negative debt) in order to avoid levying distorting taxes.
Consumers never lend to the government but do borrow from it. The government smooths taxes as well as it can subject to the constraint that in each period it can lend but never borrow.
Our first result is that, no matter what the discount factor is, trigger mechanisms which specify reversion to this Markov equilibrium cannot support equilibria with positive debt. In particular, they cannot support Ramsey outcomes with positive debt. This result is strikingly different from the results in the existing macroeconomic literature in which such trigger mechanisms can be used to support the Ramsey outcomes.
The key reason for the difference is that the existing literature considers repeated models without state variables that link periods. Our model has debt as a state variable and thus gives rise to a dynamic rather than a repeated game.
The intuition for the result that these trigger mechanisms which specify reversion to this Markov equilibrium cannot support positive debt is as follows. Suppose by way of contradiction that such trigger mechanisms produce an outcome with positive debt. Consider the date at which the debt, measured in terms of its present value at date zero, is maximal. Let the government default on the debt at this date and, for the moment, leave all policies and allocations unchanged. Now government revenues must exceed expenditures at this date, that is the government must run a surplus, since the debt is maximal at this date. Similarly the cumulated value of revenues from this date to any subsequent date must exceed the cumulated value of expenditures. Thus, the government must be a net creditor at each date after the maximal date. It turns out that the Markov equilibrium allocations maximize utility subject to the constraint that the government can lend but never borrow. Therefore, reversion to this Markov equilibrium cannot support positive debt.
The Markov equilibrium described above seems like a natural starting point for an analysis of default on government debt. In the model the government clearly has an incentive to default on positive debt and to accept negative debt. Realizing this consumers have an incentive not to lend to the government but they are quite willing to borrow from it. It is natural to expect that these incentives imply that government debt can be negative but never positive. Since the government is maximizing consumer's utility it is also natural to expect that the equilibrium outcomes maximize consumer utility subject to the constraints that government debt is never positive and, of course, that revenues are raised through distorting taxes. One might even speculate that in a finite horizon version of our economy that this is the unique equilibrium. It turns out that this is not true. We show by way of a two-period example that there can be multiple Markov equilibria. In the example there are two Markov equilibria. In both of them government debt is negative, but only one of them maximizes utility subject to the constraint that the government debt is never positive. It is straightforward to extend this example to a long finite or infinite horizon. We show how such multiple equilibria can be used to construct trigger mechanisms along the lines of Benoit and Krishna [6] , which support positive debt in either finite or infinite horizon versions of the model. This paper is related to a large literature in game theory on the Folk theorem for infinite horizon games. This theorem cannot be applied directly in our model since our setup differs from the standard setup in repeated games as in Fudenberg and Maskin [16] in two respects. First, in standard repeated games there are several large agents while in our model there is one large agent and a large number of competitive private agents. As we discussed in Chari-Kehoe [10] , even in repeated models with competitive private agents the standard Folk theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin [16] does not hold. In such repeated models a modified version of this theorem does hold and it is similar in spirit to the modifications discussed in Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin [14] and Fudenberg and Levine [15] who study repeated games with a long-lived player and a sequence of short-lived players. Second, our model is not a repeated game, but rather it is a dynamic game with debt as a state variable. The quantity of debt owed by consumers affects the set of feasible outcomes.
This debt is, of course, determined by past decisions. In contrast, in repeated games the history does not affect the set of feasible outcomes even if it affects equilibrium outcomes.
Related work on debt and default includes Calvo [9] , Grossman and Van Huyck [18] , Bulow and Rogoff [7] , and Atkeson [2] . Calvo developed models which generate positive debt in equilibrium. This debt emerges not because of trigger strategies, but rather because there is a direct cost of default. The main focus of Calvo's work is to investigate how such costs can generate a multiplicity of equilibria which are similar to the type in our two period example. Bulow and Rogoff [7] consider a partial equilibrium model of international borrowing and lending with constant interest rates, and prove a stronger result, namely, that no equilibrium can have positive debt. Some of our arguments are related to theirs except that ours are more complicated because of general equilibrium interactions of consumer's expectations of future policies and the set of feasible current government policies. Grossman and Van Huyck and Atkeson use reputation-type arguments to support positive debt in a model of international borrowing and lending.
In this paper we will consider a deterministic economy. It will become clear that our results go through in an economy with uncertainty. This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the model which is a variant of the optimal fiscal policy models of Prescott [22] , Barro [4] , Lucas and Stokey [20] , and
Persson, Persson, and Svensson [21] . Section 2 considers an environment with commitment and characterizes the resulting equilibrium, called a Ramsey equilibrium, which is a dynamic counterpart of the static equilibrium considered by Ramsey [23] . We characterize the Ramsey equilibrium as a solution to a planning problem.
Section 3 considers an environment without commitment. We allow the allocation rules of consumers and policy plans of the government to depend on the whole history of past government policies. We define a sustainable equilibrium to be a set of allocation rules and policy plans that satisfy sequential rationality conditions for both the private agents and the government. Section 4 characterizes a Markov equilibrium and the set of outcomes that can be sustained by a reversion to it. We show that the Markov policies and allocations solve a certain programming problem. In Section 5 we show that no equilibrium with positive debt can be supported by reverting to the Markov equilibrium. Section 6 contains some examples that illustrate this result. In Section 7 we show that even in a two-period example there are two equilibria-a good one with a low interest rate and a bad one with a high interest rate. We show how trigger mechanisms which specify reversion to the bad equilibrium after a default can support outcomes with positive debt. Section 8 concludes.
The Economy
Consider a simple production economy populated by a large number of identical, infinitely-lived consumers. In each period t, there are two goods: labor and a consumption good. A constant returns-to-scale technology is available to transform one unit of labor into one unit of output. The output can be used for private consumption or for government consumption. Let t and c t denote the per capita levels of labor and private consumption. The per capita level of government consumption in each period, denoted g t ,i s exogenously specified. Feasibility requires that c t +g t = t .
(1.1)
The preferences of each consumer are given by
where 0 < β < 1 and U is increasing in consumption, decreasing in labor, twice differentiable, strictly concave and bounded. We assume that the endowment of leisure time is given by¯so that ≤¯and that the utility function satisfies the Inada conditions: lim c→0 U c (c, ) = ∞ for all <¯and lim →¯U (c,¯)=− ∞ for all c, where U c and U denote the partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to consumption and labor respectively. In addition, we assume that consumption and leisure are normal goods.
Government consumption is financed by a proportional tax on labor income and by debt. Let τ t denote the tax rate on labor income in period t. Following Lucas and Stokey [20] 
Commitment
Consider an environment in which there is an institution or a commitment technology through which the government can bind itself to a particular sequence of policies once and for all at time zero. In particular, the government can commit to never defaulting on its debt. The government technology for commitment is formalized by having the government choose an infinite sequence of numbers π =( π t ) ∞ t=0 at the beginning of time and then having consumers choose their allocations. Since the government needs to predict how consumers will respond to its policies, consumer behavior is described by rules that associate government policies with allocations. Formally, an allocation rule is a sequence of functions f = (f t ) 
Proof. In the Ramsey equilibrium the government must satisfy its budget constraint taking as given the allocation rule f(π). These requirements impose restrictions on the set of allocations the government can achieve by varying its policies. We claim that these restrictions are summarized by (2. 
Now if at an allocation the value of the initial debt, namely, β t U c (c t , t ) −1 b t , is positive it is optimal for the government to default by setting δ 0 = 1. If it is somewhat negative it is optimal for the government to accept it by setting δ 0 = 0. If the value of the initial debt is so negative that it exceeds the whole present value of government spending it is optimal for the government to accept just enough of this debt so that it can set taxes equal to zero forever. Thus, using optimality by the government, we can reduce (2.7) to (2.4). Hence the requirement that the government sets δ 0 optimally and that it satisfy its budget constraint together with the requirement that allocations are consistent with the allocation rule f(π) imply (2.3) and (2.4).
Next, given any allocations c and that satisfy (2.3) and (2.4) we can construct sequences of tax rates, default rates, debt prices, and levels of debt such that these allocations are consistent with the allocation rule f and the government's budget constraints. Equation (2.4) gives the tax rates. There are a large number of ways to set the rest of the policies. To derive the debt prices recursively use (2.5) to get
where t q t = 1. To derive the debt and default sequences multiply the consumer's budget constraint by β t U c (c t , t ), sum over t, and use (2.2), (2.5), and (2.6) and then update a period to get (2.9)
Any sequence δ and b which satisfy (2.9), debt prices which satisfy (2.8) and tax rates which satisfy (2.4) will decentralize the Ramsey consumption and labor allocations. One particular way is to set the default rate for δ t ,t≥ 1 identically equal to zero, set the debt prices t q s = β s−t U c (c s , s )/U c (c t , t ) and the debt sequence by (2.9) with the δ's set to zero. Notice that (2.9) pins down the present value of the debt but not its composition.
So, for example, we could decentralize the Ramsey equilibrium with one period debt by letting
and t b s =0f o rs>t+1 .
As the proof of this proposition makes clear the Ramsey equilibrium pins down only the present value of the future debt and not its composition. As Lucas and Stokey have emphasized, however, in environments without commitment the composition of the debt affects the incentives of the government in the future when it optimizes given some inherited debt. Indeed in that environment the first order conditions at any date t will be affected by the composition of the debt. We will study such an environment in the next section. For now, however, we can get a sense of the importance of the composition of the debt in the environment with commitment. To see this imagine solving the Ramsey problem at date 0 and suppose that, at the Ramsey allocations, the present value of the initial debt is negative. The first order conditions at date t would be
where the partial derivatives of U and R are evaluated at (c t , t ) and λ is the Lagrange multiplier on (2.3). Now suppose −1 b is another debt sequence with the same present value at the original Ramsey allocations, namely
but with a different composition of debt. Clearly the original equilibrium will, typically, no longer be optimal because the first order conditions (2.11) will not be satisfied at the new debt level −1 b t . Because of this feature it will be important to allow the government to issue multiperiod debt in the environment without commitment.
Indeed, if we constrain the government to issue only one period debt it would constrain the set of equilibrium allocations. For an extreme example of this phenomenon, recall that Lucas and Stokey studied an environment which is the same as this one except that they did not allow default. Their main result was that if there was a rich enough maturity structure for the debt then the Ramsey equilibrium is time consistent. If, however, debt is restricted, say, to being only one period debt then, typically, the Ramsey equilibrium is not time consistent.
For later use we will say an outcome (π,x) is attainable under commitment if it satisfies the government budget constraints and x maximizes consumer utility at date zero subject to consumer budget constraints. From the proof of the proposition it follows immediately that an outcome is attainable under commitment if the associated allocations satisfy (2.3) and (2.7). Intuitively, this requirement captures the limits on what the government could ever hope to achieve when faced with optimizing private agents even if it could commit to suboptimal policies.
No Commitment
Consider an environment in which no commitment technologies are available to the government.
Formally, the lack of commitment by the government is modeled by having the government choose policy sequentially. In each period, the government and the consumers can vary their decisions depending on the history of government policies up to the time the decision is made. At the beginning of period t, the government chooses a current policy as a function of the history h t−1 =( π s s=0,...,t−1) together with a contingency plan for setting future policies for all possible future histories. Let σ t (h t−1 ) denote the time t labor tax rate, default rate, and price of debt chosen by the government when faced with history h t−1 . After the government sets current policy, consumers make their decisions. Faced with a history h t =(h t−1 ,π t ), consumers choose time t levels of consumption, labor supply, and debt holdings, denoted f t (h t ), together with a contingency plan for choosing future allocations. (The reader may wonder why the histories do not include consumers' decisions. For a discussion of this point see Chari and Kehoe [10] .)
In order to define a sustainable equilibrium, we need to explain how policy plans induce future histories. Given a history h t−1 , the policy plan σ induces future histories by h t =( h t−1 ,σ t (h t−1 )) and so on.
Given a history h t−1 , a continuation policy of σ is (σ t (h t−1 ),σ t+1 (h t−1 ,σ t (h t−1 )),...). Similarly, given a history h t and a policy plan σ, a continuation allocation of f is (f t (h t ),f t+1 (h t ,σ t+1 (h t ),...).
Consider the situation of the government in period t. Given some history h t−1 and given that future allocations evolve according to f, the government chooses a continuation policy that maximizes the welfare of consumers
where for all s ≥ t the future histories are induced by σ from h t−1 .
Consider next a private agent in period t. Given some history h t and given that future policies evolve according to σ, a consumer chooses a continuation allocation to maximize
and, fors>t ,
together with the debt constraints for s ≥ t, d 2 ≤ s b(h s ) ≤ d 1 where π t is given in h t and for all s > t the future histories are induced by σ from h t .A sustainable equilibrium is a pair (σ,f) that satisfies the following conditions: (i) Given the allocation rule f, for every history h t−1 the continuation policy of σ solves the government's problem; (ii) given a policy plan σ, for every history h t the continuation allocation of f solves the consumer's problem. Note that in the definition we require that both the consumers and the government act optimally for every history of policies-even for histories which are not induced by the government's strategy or histories which have violated feasibility. This requirement is analogous to the requirement of perfection in a game.
A Markov Equilibrium
We begin by constructing a simple equilibrium called the Markov equilibrium. In this equilibrium, government debt is never positive. We then examine those outcomes that can be supported by trigger-type mechanisms which specify reversion to the Markov equilibrium after deviations. We characterize the set of outcomes that can be supported by these trigger mechanisms by a set of inequalities. In Sections 5 and 6, we develop the implications of this characterization for supporting positive debt.
A sustainable equilibrium is said to be (utility) Markov if for any pair of histories h t−1 and ĥ t−1 such To gain some intuition for (4.6) note that in constructing a sustainable equilibrium we must define the consumer allocation rule for all histories including ones in which the government deviates. Now suppose at t − 1 the consumers saved t−1 b and at the beginning of period t the government deviates to some policy π t which may not meet its period t budget constraint. Problem (4.6) defines the consumer's optimal allocation given that the consumer expects the government to follow the same policies as it does in problem (4.1) in all periods s ≥ t + 1. We elaborate on this connection between problems (4.1) and (4.6) below.
We use program Suppose next that at some date t with some inherited debt there is more than one solution to (4.1).
We then define σ t m (h t−1 ) as follows. The history h t−1 yields the policy π t−1 which was chosen at date t − 1. In the proof of this proposition we will use the fact that, by construction, problems (4. with inherited debt r−1 b specified in the solution to the date t problem. To see this note that the only way the continuation of the date t allocations would not be chosen for the date r problem was that there was some other continuation allocation which yielded higher utility from r onward. But this would contradict the fact that in the date t problem the allocation from r onward satisfied constraint (4.5). Thus problem (4.1) is recursive.
By a similar argument problem (4.6) is recursive.
We will also use the fact that the solutions to (4.1) and (4.6) overlap in the obvious senses. The first sense of overlap is that if we solve (4.6) at some arbitrary ( t−1 b,π t ) then the solution to (4.6) from t + 1 onward will coincide with the solution to (4.1) when (4.1) is started at the t b given in the solution to (4.6).
The second sense of overlap is that if we consider maximizing (4.6) with respect to π t subject to the government budget constraint we will get the first element π t in the solution to (4.1). That is,
subject to τ tt + t q t b=g t + (1−δ t ) t q t−1 b where t and t b denote the functions given in the solution to (4.6) evaluated at ( t−1 b,π t ).
Proof. Consider first optimality by consumers. At date t, given some history h t =( h t−1 ,π t ), consumers maximize their utility (3. Given any solution to this problem, it is clear that we can construct policies from the consumer's first order conditions so that the allocations and policies solve problem (4.1).
It should be clear that if the value of the debt at the optimal allocations is strictly positive than it is also optimal to default completely by setting δ t = 1. This same result holds at t + 1, t + 2, and so on.
Therefore, it follows that the solution to (4.8) must satisfy the condition that at all future dates, the value of the debt at the optimal allocations must be nonpositive. Now multiplying (4.11) by β s−r and summing from r to infinity and using the fact at an optimal allocation the value of the debt is always nonpositive we obtain namely that the present value of the government's surpluses is nonpositive at all future dates. Note that (4.14)
is a necessary condition for the continuation allocations from any history of the Markov equilibrium. We use the necessity of (4.14) repeatedly in what follows.
We now turn to the characterization of the Markov allocation when t−1 b = 0. In this case, it turns out that the allocations which solve (4.8) solve the following programming problem The essential difference between problems (4.8) and (4.15) is that constraint (4.13) is replaced by (4.18) which requires that the present value of the government's surplus be nonpositive at all future dates. The other inessential differences are that we have used optimality of the choice of δ t to reduce (4.10) to (4.17) and that in problem (4.15) the debt has been substituted out as a choice variable and thus we have dropped the transition equation for debt (4.11). Note that, except for constraint (4.18), this problem is the same as the programming problem in Lucas and Stokey [20] .
In the Appendix we show The construction of the debt sequence we use in the proof is similar to the one in Lucas and Stokey [20] .
Revert-to-Markov Equilibria
We can use the Markov equilibrium of Section 4 to help characterize other possible sustainable outcomes. To characterize such outcomes, we use a modified version of the Markov equilibrium, which we call the revert-to-Markov equilibria. (These equilibria are the natural competitive analogues of the trigger-strategy equilibria of repeated games which specify reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium.) For an arbitrary sequence (π,x), define the revert-to-Markov plans as follows. Consider first the allocation rules.
For any history h t , these plans specify the allocation x t given by x if the tax rates (π 0 ,...,π t−1 ) have been chosen according to π. If they have not, then revert to the Markov allocation rules in the following sense: Suppose the first deviation, to policy π t , occurs at date t. Then the allocation rules at date t are given by the solution to (4.6) at ( t−1 b,π t ) where t−1 b is given from x. For any policy π t+1 the allocation rules at date t + 1 are given by the solution to (4.6) at ( t b m (h t ),π t+1 ) where t b m (h t ) is the solution to (4.6) at ( t−1 b,π t ). Allocation rules for all future dates are defined recursively. We define the reversion policy rules for the government analogously.
We then have Proof. Suppose some arbitrary sequence (π,x) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). We show that the associated revert-to-Markov plans constitute a sustainable equilibrium. Consider histories under which there have been no deviations from π before time t. By condition (i), x is optimal for consumers at date zero when they are faced with π, and thus it is clear that the continuation of x is optimal for consumers at date t when they are faced with the continuation of π. Consider the situation of the government. When it is confronted with revert-to-Markov allocation rules and given the fact that it will follow Markov policies from t + 1 on, the best one-shot deviation for the government is simply the Markov policy at t. Thus, using (4.7), condition (5.1) guarantees that the government's plans are optimal for such histories.
Consider now histories for which there has been a deviation at or before time t. The plans for the consumers and the government specify the Markov plans from then on. By the same argument as in Proposition 2, these plans are optimal.
We now turn to our main result. To prove this result, we assume that the value of the (negative)
surplus generated with zero taxes is uniformly bounded across different levels of government spending. Note that with zero taxes the surplus R t =U c (τ tt −g t ) reduces to R t =− g t U c . Let c(g t ) and (g t ) maximize utility subject to the resource constraint c t +g t = t . We assume
is finite. Under this assumption we have Proposition 6 (Nonsupportability of Positive Debt). In any revert-to-Markov equilibrium the value of debt is nonpositive at each date.
Proof. Suppose not, that is, suppose there is some sequence of allocations (c t , t ) and associated sequence of surpluses (R t ) which is the outcome of a revert-to-Markov equilibrium in which the debt is strictly positive at some date. We will obtain a contradiction by showing there is a date for which deviating from the conjectured outcome to the Markov equilibrium yields higher utility then continuing with the conjectured outcome. We will accomplish this by constructing allocations which are better than the conjectured outcome but worse than the Markov outcome.
To this end recall that the transversality condition on debt holdings (2.6) implies By (5.3) for any ε > 0 we can choose t large enough so that the second term is less than ε for all T 1 ≥ t.
Combining this with (5.2) gives this loss in revenues is no greater than
Clearly then a plan of defaulting at T, pursuing the original policies until T 1 − 1 then switching to zero taxes after T 1 is feasible for the Markov problem in that it satisfies (4.17) and (4.18). Since it leads to higher welfare than the original equilibrium we have a contradiction.
Two remarks about this proposition are in order. First, the assumption on bounded (negative) surpluses under the zero tax plan is quite innocuous. It is satisfied, for example, whenever there are a finite number of values of government consumption. Second, under the assumption that −1 b ≡ 0, the allocations under the revert-to-Markov equilibrium are unique and solve problem (4.15) . To see this, note that any revert-to-Markov equilibrium must have nonpositive debt at each date and so, such equilibrium allocations must always satisfy (4.18). Since (4.15) maximizes utility over such allocations, the best policy for the government is simply to revert to the Markov equilibrium at date zero.
Examples
In this section, we consider four examples, which illustrate the logic behind Proposition 5. In each we let the initial debt sequence be identically zero. In such a case it follows immediately from combining the first order conditions to the Ramsey problem (2.11) with the resource constraint (2.2) that the Ramsey allocations only depend on the current level of spending g t . In particular, the optimal surplus R t under the Ramsey plan only depends on the current g t . We write the optimal surplus as R(g t ). For concreteness let the utility function be such that the surplus under the Ramsey plan R(g t ) is decreasing. This will be true for a variety of utility functions (see Chari and Kehoe [11] ).
In Example 1, the Ramsey allocations never have positive debt and so are sustainable. by defaulting on the debt and suffers no loss from then on from losing the ability to issue positive debt. Of course, in equilibrium consumers anticipate the date 1 default and buy no government debt at date 0 and thus force the government to balance the budget at date 0.
In Examples 1 and 2, government consumption follows a two-period cycle. We now consider two examples in which it follows a K-period cycle.
Example 3. Let g t = γ k for t = nk where k = 1, ..., K and the integer n > 0. Let 0 = γ 1 < γ 2 < ... < γ k . Notice that government consumption monotonically increases over each K-period cycle. Let R be decreasing under the Ramsey plan. Under this plan, the budget is balanced over each cycle so that
Since R( ) is decreasing, we know that K k=r β k R(γ k ) < 0, for r = 2, ..., K.
Hence, the Ramsey plan coincides with the Markov plan and thus is sustainable.
Example 4. Consider the same pattern of government consumption as in Example 3, except now let government consumption start at some γ j . That is, let g t = γ t+J f o rt=1 ,. . . ,K−J ,a n dg t+J = γ k for t = nk where k = 1, ..., K, and the integer n ≥ 1. Again, under the Ramsey plan, the budget is balanced over each
Notice that for appropriately chosen J, the debt will be positive under the Ramsey plan. Now consider a policy similar to the one used in Example 2: default on the debt in period K − J and follow the Markov plan from then on. Clearly, this Markov plan is simply the Ramsey plan of Example 3, and it yields higher utility than does the continuation of the original Ramsey plan. Thus, the original Ramsey plan is not sustainable.
The intuition for Examples 3 and 4 is similar to that for Examples 1 and 2. In Example 3 the economy begins in peacetime. Under commitment optimally financing of the gradually escalating war involves selling nonpositive debt. These policies is sustainable without commitment. In Example 4 the economy starts in the middle of the war and under commitment optimal financing would involve issuing positive debt during the war. Under this plan at the end of the war the government sells positive debt into the next peacetime. In this period of peace if there is no commitment the government finds it optimal to default on the inherited debt and switch to the financing pattern of Example 3 which has nonpositive debt. Thus in the period of peace the government gains from defaulting on the positive debt and, at least from this point onward, does not suffer any loss from losing the ability to sell positive debt. Thus threats which specify that it will lose this ability are not sufficient to deter it from defaulting. In equilibrium, consumers anticipate the government default and do not buy positive debt to begin with.
Other Equilibria
Thus far we have focused on a particular type of Markov equilibrium and equilibria which can be sustained by reverting to this Markov equilibrium. Here we discuss some other equilibria of the model.
We begin with a two period example. Let g 0 = 0 and g 1 This generates decision rules for consumption, labor supply, and debt. We focus on the decision rule for debt given by 0 b 1 =B ( τ 0 , 0 q 1 ,τ 1 ,δ 1 ).
We can use these functions to construct an equilibrium. Consider first the default rule ∆ 1 ( 0 b 1 ). This rule is given necessarily be increasing in the debt since a more negative debt means that the government has less need to resort to distorting taxes. The result that the debt rule is increasing follows because consumption and leisure are normal goods. It should not be surprising that a pair of increasing functions intersect more than once.
Experimentation with a variety of examples suggests that multiple intersections are the rule rather than the exception. The two period setup is the simplest environment with a potential time inconsistency problem. The apparent ease with which multiple equilibria arise in this setup suggests that multiplicity of equilibria is pervasive even in finite horizon environments with sequential policymaking. It is worth pointing out that in this example even if we require that the government honor its debt, as in Lucas and Stokey [20] , we get the same equilibrium. Note also that the better equilibrium is the Markov equilibrium of Section 4. The bad equilibrium is also a Markov equilibrium. From the construction in Section 4 it should be clear that the equilibrium there is the best of the Markov equilibria.
It is also worth pointing out that the competitive behavior of private agents plays an important role in generating this multiplicity. In our model, no single consumer perceives that his savings decision affects the future tax rate, yet the aggregate savings does indeed affect the future tax rate. To see the importance of this competitive behavior, consider instead a two period example such as ours with literally a single consumer.
This consumer would realize that his saving decision determines the future tax rate. Thus the consumer can effectively pick the best point on the government's policy rule T 1 (b) and there is a unique equilibrium. More generally in a finite horizon game with only sequential moves if the best reply correspondence for each agent at each node is single-valued, it is easy to see that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium which can be obtained by backward induction.
Finally, note that in our example we have constructed equilibria with two types of selections from the multiple intersections. In one we chose the high intersections for all date 0 policies while in the other we chose the low intersection for all date 0 policies. More elaborate selection procedures which for some date 0 policies pick the high intersection and for others pick the low one will typically lead to more equilibria. Now let us relate our construction to the definition of a sustainable equilibrium. A sustainable equilibrium requires that the allocation rule f 1 (π 0 ,π 1 ) maximizes consumer utility for each history h 1 =(π 0 ,π 1 ), where the inherited debt is given by 0 b 1 (π 0 ). Therefore, we have
14)
The definition of sustainable equilibrium also requires that σ 1 (π 0 ) maximizes date 1 welfare subject to the government budget constraint given that consumer allocations are determined according to f 1 and that inherited debt is 0 b 1 (π 0 ). Thus, One might think that the government would default on this debt and then switch to the policies given in Example 2. This is the optimal policy, of course, when consumer's allocations are given by the revert-toMarkov allocation rules. Suppose instead that if the government defaults the consumer allocation rule prescribes choosing the allocations corresponding to the lower intersection in Figure 1 . For high enough discount factors the current gain from defaulting on the debt is outweighed by the losses of switching to this bad equilibrium forever. In fact for suitable parameter values positive debt can be sustained and for high enough discount factors it is even possible to sustain the Ramsey equilibrium outcomes starting at date 0.
Notice that here we have constructed trigger equilibria along the lines of Benoit and Krishna [6] . Of course, one could use complicated triggers to construct many others.
Conclusion
For nearly a decade economists, using differing levels of formality, have used trigger mechanism arguments for a variety of macroeconomic issues. Almost all of the formal literature, however, has analyzed these trigger arguments by using the repeated static game models similar to those used in the industrial organization literature. (See, for example, Barro and Gordon [5] , and Backus and Driffill [3] .) While this literature was a useful first step it is not obvious that its insights carry over to standard macromodels which are inherently dynamic. The classic papers on time consistency (including Kydland and Prescott [22] ; Calvo [8] ; Lucas and Stokey [20] ; and Persson, Persson, and Svensson [21] ) use standard general equilibrium macromodels with state variables such as capital, money, or debt. These models give rise to dynamic games and not repeated static games.
The point of this paper is to analyze the role of trigger mechanism arguments in resolving a classic problem in the time consistency literature, namely, the incentives for governments to default on their debt.
We have analyzed these arguments in the simplest version of the classic general equilibrium macromodels.
We have shown that in such a model reputational arguments work in a more subtle way than they do in repeated models. To see the difference between our results and those from repeated static models note that in repeated games even if there are multiple equilibria in the static game, reversion to any of the multiple equilibria supports good outcomes when there is sufficiently little discounting. In our model regardless of the discount factor reverting to the (best) Markov equilibrium cannot support the Ramsey outcome. It seems likely that trigger mechanism arguments will be even more subtle in more elaborate general equilibrium macromodels.
We also find it interesting that even in the simplest dynamic model with a finite horizon, multiple equilibria seem to be the norm rather than the exception. This feature means that even in finite horizon models the set of sustainable equilibria is large and difficult to characterize. In particular, this set cannot be characterized solely by simple backward induction arguments. We think that more complicated versions of this model with money or capital added will share similar features. In this vein notice that the multiplicity of equilibria in the finite horizon version of our model does not arise from the ability of the government to default on its debt.
Finally, in this paper, we have adopted the standard approach in the time consistency literature by assuming that all the commitment problems lie with the government. In a related paper, Chari and Kehoe [11] , we examined an environment in which both private agents and the government can default on their debts, and we obtained quite different results. In particular, we showed that Ramsey equilibrium with positive debt can be supported with sufficiently little discounting. One reason for the difference is that in that model, private agents always default on their debts and thus government debt can only be promises to pay by the government.
Since the government can default, these nonbinding promises do not constrain the policies available to the government. In contrast, in the present paper, consumers' promises to pay are enforceable and thus influence the policies available to the government. The differing results in the two papers illustrates that there is a delicate interplay between the nature of commitment technologies and the sustainability of good outcomes.
It is worth exploring this interplay in future research. Recall that by hypothesis, constraint (4.18) does not bind from dates t + 1 to T 1 − 1. Thus, β s R s ≤ 0.
